The Political Economy of Punishment

Safe and Sound? Evaluating Citizens’ Interacting Demands for Punishment and Welfare

When and why do citizens prefer the government to pursue punishment in response to crime? In this paper, I establish a preference formation mechanism for punitiveness and examine how perceptions of social phenomena such as crime, inequality and austerity catalyze this attitude. I argue that fear of crime victimization predicts punitive attitudes while fears of contact with the carceral system and income loss predict preferences for a more rehabilitative approach. These risks should intersect to make income have an increasing effect on punitiveness. Further, I expect individuals to develop their preferences based on whether they perceive being the target or beneficiary of policies such as punishment and welfare. The hypotheses are tested within the case of the United Kingdom through an original YouGov survey fielded in April 2019. Results of the analysis support many of stated hypotheses and the relevance of policy visibility to personal cost-benefit analyses. Opportunities for cross-class coalitions are found to emerge when a) the anti-welfare rich align with the poor who do not perceive state benefits reaching them to support punishment or b) the anti-punishment poor align with the rich who perceive higher positive externalities from welfare when living in high crime and inequality regions.

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• Pfeffer, Elle. (2019, December 6). “Boris Johnson wants to get tougher on crime. Voters might reward him for it.” The Washington Post. https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/12/06/boris-johnson-wants-get-tougher-crime-voters-might-reward-him-it/.

Electoral Incentives Determining Variation in Criminal Justice System Design

Even as crime rates have fallen in recent decades, incarceration rates have not followed the same trajectory in all cases. There is substantial variation between countries as well within countries over time. Why are some countries more punitive than others in handling crime within their borders? I develop a political economy driven approach to examining the institutional structures behind different punishment equilibria. I argue that criminal justice system punitiveness is in part a function of the constraints imposed on legislators by electoral (proportional representation vs. majoritarian) institutions. These constraints present different incentives for politicians to design policies that shift or absorb the costs of crime in connection with the extent of welfare state targeting to the electorate. These decisions, all in the context of broader country-specific factors such as ethnic and racial heterogeneity, form a kind of resource trade-off between prison budgets and rehabilitative or proactive social spending. I test these theoretical claims through cross-country quantitative analysis using the Manifesto Project Dataset complemented by qualitative case studies of Finland and the United Kingdom that employ elite interviews and process tracing. The findings have crucial implications as both populist politicians campaigning on issues of "law and order" and their opponents who seek reform on levels both national and local surge in popularity with electorates worldwide.

*Available upon request.